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INTRODUCTION 
Across the country, storefront window displays have become frames 
for large neon posters that scream: “Going out of business!”; entrances 
have been adorned with large yellow banners proclaiming in bold 
letters: “Everything Must Go!” In a matter of weeks, store shelves that 
were once fully stocked become victims of savage bargain hunters.  
Eventually, the stores are stripped clean until only the bolted down 
shelves remain.  It is a scene that has unfolded uniformly at myriad 
retail locations of Sharper Image, Bombay Co., Linens ’n Things, and 
Circuit City.1 Today, these stores have become empty shells, serving 
only as blighted reminders of hard economic times.2  Yet, even as 
bargain hunters have snatched up every ionic air cleanser, incense 
holder, pillow sham, and cell phone charger from these bankrupt 
retailers, the most valuable asset remains—the store’s brand.3   
Investors know that while a company may be bankrupt in the sense 
of its hard assets, significant value remains in the brand itself.4  For 
 
1. Amy Zipkin, Brand Names Live after Stores Close, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009, at B1. 
2.  For the 12-month period ending September 30, 2009, business filings totaled 58,721, 
up 52% from the 38,651 business filings in the 12-month period ending September 30, 2008; 
Chapter 11 filings rose 68%, increasing from 8,799 in fiscal year 2008 to 14,745 in fiscal year 
2009.  Press Release, U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings up 34 Percent over Last Fiscal Year 
(Nov. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2009/BankruptcyFilingsSep2009.cfm. 
3. In 2009, one firm paid $175 million to buy the Sharper Image, Linens ‘n Things, and 
Bombay brands.  Zipkin, supra note 1; see also Tom Hals, Bankrupt KB Toys Trademark, 
Logos Sold at Auction, REUTERS, Aug. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0631809020090806 (stating bankrupt toy retailer sold its 
trademark, logos, and web addresses for $2.1 million). 
4. Rob Walker, Cleaned Sheets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009, at MM18; A trademark 
may be valued in several different ways.  See Michael J. Freno, Trademark Valuation: 
Preserving Brand Equity, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1055 (2007) (explaining valuation of marks 
for damages calculations and other purposes).  While a trademark is legally protectable, the 
concept of a “brand” is a broader, non-legal characterization of a trademark.  Id. at 1056.  
Like trademarks, brands can designate the source of a product or service, but they 
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example, The Sharper Image, which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection in 2008, is no longer a retail company with stores and retail 
associates.  Instead, The Sharper Image has reincarnated itself as a 
“global lifestyle brand licensor.”5  So while a customer can no longer 
walk into a Sharper Image store and try out the “deluxe shiatsu foot 
massager,” a customer in search of the “Sharper Image experience” can 
still buy Sharper Image licensed merchandise at Macy’s, Best Buy, or 
OfficeMax.6  Thus, The Sharper Image has reorganized itself from a 
failed capital-based business, to a more sustainable royalty-driven 
business that exploits the value of its brand, and its trademark in 
particular.7  
Although THE SHARPER IMAGE trademark has found a happy 
ending in life after bankruptcy, that is not always the case for trademark 
licensees.  Rather, for licensees, the intersection of trademark law and 
bankruptcy law has largely been a train wreck: The courts are divided 
over debtor-licensee rights, and Congress has neglected the problem.8  
As trademark rights become an increasingly valuable asset9 in 
 
go further, conveying information about a particular product or service, the core 
trademark behind the brand, other trademarks supporting the brand, any family of 
marks, domain names, sub-brands, product packaging, the manufacturer and its 
trade name, advertising of the product, distribution of the product, celebrity 
endorsements, and even the shelf displays at retailers and/or displays on the 
Internet.  
Id.  Interbrand, a leading surveyor of international brand value, determines brand value as a 
“financial representation of a business’ earnings due to the superior demand created for its 
products and services through the strength of its brand.”  Interbrand, Interbrand’s Method for 
Valuating the Best Global Brands, available at 
http://www.interbrand.com/best_global_brands_methodology.aspx?langid=1000 (last accessed 
Jan. 10, 2010).  According to Interbrand, the most valuable global brands in 2009 were: 
CocaCola, $69 million; IBM, $60 million; Microsoft, $57 million; GE, $48 million; and Nokia, 
$35 million. Interbrand, Best Global Brands 2009, available at 
http://www.interbrand.com/images/studies/-1_BGB2009_Magazine_Final.pdf. 
5. Eric Taub, Sharper Image Stores Are Dead, but the Brand Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 18, 2009, at B4.  
6. The Sharper Image branded merchandise is available at Macy’s and JCPenney.  
Zipkin, supra note 1; Taub, supra note 5.   The Sharper Image products are marketed by 
several licensees.  See  “Licensing Opportunities,” 
http://www.sharperimageusa.com/#licensing (last visited Mar. 15, 2010); “The Sharper Image 
by S.I. Products,” http://www.siproducts.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
7. Zipkin, supra note 1.   
8. See generally 11 U.S.C § 101(35A) (2006); N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. Blanks (In re 
N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc.), 337 B.R. 230, 235–36 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005), aff’d, 2008 WL 
2192094 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1578 (2009); Stuart M. Riback, 
Intellectual Property Licenses: The Impact of Bankruptcy, 985 PLI/PAT 657, 672 (Oct.-Dec. 
2009).  
9. WESTON ANSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VALUATION: A 
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Chapter 11 reorganizations,10 it is critical for Congress and the courts to 
clarify how trademarks will be treated in bankruptcy.  Resolution is 
particularly important for trademark licensees seeking to revive their 
businesses through reorganization.  Recent cases demonstrate that 
Chapter 11 reorganization may not be a viable option for businesses 
that depend on licensing.  Rather, most courts will allow a licensor to 
strip the bankrupt licensee of its rights, therefore stifling any chance of a 
licensee’s successful reorganization. 
This Comment urges that a trademark licensee should not be 
stripped of its licensing rights simply because the licensee enters 
bankruptcy.  Instead, where a licensee intends only to continue using an 
existing license under the terms of the existing agreement with the 
licensor, the licensee’s use of that license should be uninterrupted 
during reorganization.  This recommendation, contrary to the position 
of trademark licensors, will not invade the province of trademark 
owners to control their marks.  
To support this recommendation, this Comment examines the 
statutory frameworks of both trademark law and bankruptcy law, 
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, and cases that illuminate the 
current circuit split over the rights of a trademark licensee in 
bankruptcy.  Building on these elements, this Comment outlines an 
analytical approach that strikes a balance between the need for business 
reorganization and the duty of a trademark licensor to exercise control 
over its mark.  
Accordingly, this Comment proceeds in three parts.  Part I provides 
a brief overview of the purposes of trademark law and bankruptcy law 
and also explains why these areas of law conflict.  Part II introduces In 
re N.C.P. Marketing Group to explain the two analytical frameworks—
the “hypothetical test” and the “actual test”—used by the courts to 
determine the rights of a trademark licensee in bankruptcy.11  Part III 
explains how federal circuit courts have employed these differing 
approaches—including one court that has attempted an end run around 
the issue. Finally, this Comment concludes that courts should adopt the 
actual test to balance the interests of both trademark licensors and 
debtor-licensees.   
 
PRIMER FOR IDENTIFYING AND DETERMINING VALUE 169 (2005). 
10. Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property: An Economic 
Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 769 (2007). 
11. In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc., 337 B.R. at 236. 
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PART I 
A.  Trademark Law vs. Bankruptcy Law: Competing Interests 
Trademark law and bankruptcy law are both concerned with the 
“use” of assets.12  For example, trademarks are given protection for their 
use in commerce.13  And in bankruptcy, assets are used to pay creditors 
and as leverage for the debtor’s “fresh start.”14  Yet, unlike physical 
assets, a trademark is not valuable in and of itself.  Rather, the value of 
a trademark depends on the underlying business it symbolizes.  This 
interdependent relationship creates competing interests between the 
trademark licensor and the debtor-licensee: On one hand, the 
trademark licensor will seek to protect its mark from any loss of control 
and ultimate harm to its business by snatching back the license.  On the 
other hand, a debtor-licensee whose business depends on the license will 
seek to use the license as leverage to keep its business going.  Yet, if the 
licensor strips the licensee of the right to use the mark, the licensor will 
virtually ensure the failure of the licensee’s bankruptcy reorganization.   
Courts that permit a licensor to strip a licensee of its right to use a 
mark favor the protectionist principles of trademark licensing while 
entirely frustrating the purpose of bankruptcy reorganization.  Instead, 
Congress and the courts must balance the rights of a trademark owner 
to protect its mark, and the ability of a business to reorganize. 
This Part will first briefly explain the unique purposes of trademark 
law and bankruptcy law.  Second, this Part will explain the existing 
conflict between these two areas of law.  
1.  Trademark Law Purpose 
A trademark is defined under the Lanham Act as a word, phrase, 
 
12. To register a mark, the Lanham Act requires that a ‘mark is in use in commerce.” 
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(c) (emphasis added).  Bankruptcy law addresses the use of a debtor’s 
assets.  See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1); see also Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918) (“The 
federal system of bankruptcy . . . intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh 
start in life . . . after the property which he owned at the time of bankruptcy has been 
administered for the benefit of creditors.”).  
13. See Mountain Top Beverage Group, Inc. v. Wildlife Brewing N.B., Inc., 338 F. 
Supp. 2d 827, 833 (2003) (stating “[b]ecause the power of Congress to register a mark stems 
from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, a trademark must be used in interstate or 
foreign commerce as that is the commerce Congress may lawfully regulate.”).  See, e.g., 
KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 51 (1999) (“Rather than 
being based on the Patent and Copyright Clause, congressional authority to regulate 
trademarks is based on the Commerce Clause.  This is why interstate commerce or ‘use’ of a 
trademark is crucial for federal protection.”). 
14. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
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logo, or symbol used in commerce to signify a source, to distinguish the 
source from competitors, and to prevent confusion in the marketplace.15  
Accordingly, a trademark owner is given the right to protect its mark 
against infringement and dilution through blurring and tarnishment.16 
The Lanham Act also allows the trademark owner to benefit from the 
goodwill associated with the mark by selling, assigning, or licensing the 
trademark to a third party.17  
a.  Trademark Licensing  
Modern trademark law has recognized and legitimized the practice 
of trademark licensing.18  Trademark licensing permits the use of a 
trademark on goods that may not “emanate directly from the trademark 
owner,”19 but rather come from a selected third party—the licensee.  
The policy behind the legitimization of trademark licensing, as endorsed 
by Congress, is to expand the national and global value of trademarks in 
the marketplace.  When a licensing agreement is successful, the mark 
becomes more widely known by consumers, increasing the mark’s 
corresponding goodwill, and ultimately making the brand more valuable 
for the mark’s owner.  Trademark licensing has proliferated to such an 
extent that an entire business models have become dependent on 
 
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) defines a trademark as:  
any word, symbol, or device or any combination thereof [that is] (1) used by a 
person or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and 
applies to register on the principal register. . . to identify or distinguish his or her 
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and 
to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown. 
 See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94–95 (1879). 
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a), 1125(c). 
17. “A trade name or mark is merely a symbol of goodwill; it has no independent 
significance apart from the goodwill it symbolizes . . . [A] trademark cannot be sold or 
assigned apart from the goodwill it symbolizes.”  Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 
1984) (setting aside and reversing attachment and auction of a trademark apart from its 
associated goodwill).  Accord Berni v. Int’l Gourmet Restaurants, Inc., 838 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 
1988) (noting the “well-established principle” that a “mark is not property that may be 
assigned ‘in gross’” and that “rights in a trademark cannot be sold apart from a going 
business.”).  See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 18:2 (4th ed. 2009). 
18. KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486  U.S. 281, 314–15 (1988).  
Not until the 1930’s did a trend develop approving of trademark licensing—so long 
as the licensor controlled the quality of the licensee’s products—on the theory that a 
trademark might also serve the function of identifying product quality for 
consumers.  And not until the passage of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act in 1946 did 
that trend become the rule.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
19. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 18:39. 
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licensing agreements with trademark owners.  However, because the 
goodwill behind a mark is a volatile commodity based on consumer 
perception, a trademark owner must continue to exercise control over 
the use of its mark in commerce.20  
b.  Licensor Control  
A trademark owner who licenses its mark has the duty to ensure a 
licensee upholds the quality of a given product.21  A licensor who fails to 
oversee the quality of its licensee’s products may not only tarnish the 
mark, but may also lead a court to find the licensor has abandoned the 
mark.22  Courts are concerned with control of licensees because of what 
a mark embodies: it is a guard against consumer confusion and deceit.23  
The courts reason that without oversight a mark connotes nothing and is 
without value in the marketplace.24  
In recent years, while courts have begun to ease this control 
requirement, courts still require that a licensor be able to demonstrate 
due diligence in supervising the use of its mark by licensees.25  
Accordingly, a licensor’s duty of control necessarily creates strict limits 
on a licensee’s use of a mark.  For example, a licensee must have the 
express permission of a licensor to sub-license a mark.26  This restrictive 
use is required “[b]ecause the owner of the trademark has an interest in 
the party to whom the trademark is assigned so that it can maintain the 
good will, quality, and value of its products and thereby its 
trademark . . . .”27  Thus, the identity of a licensee is a critical and 
material matter under trademark law.28   
The personal nature of trademark licenses and restrictions on 
assignability create unique roadblocks for trademark licensees in 
 
20. Id. § 18:42. 
21. Id. 
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1127, 1604 (2006); see, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, 
Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). 
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
24. Id. 
25. See, e.g., Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose 
Time Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 797 (2005). 
26. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 18:43 (stating “[w]ithout specific authorization from 
the trademark owner, the licensee’s right to use the licensed mark is personal and cannot be 
sold or assigned to another”). 
27. N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. Blanks (In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc.), 337 B.R. 230, 236 
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2005). 
28. Id. 
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bankruptcy.29  Moreover, the unique nature of a trademark license 
makes it a virtually irreplaceable commodity.  Accordingly, a licensor 
wields extraordinary power over a licensee: a licensor who chooses to 
terminate a trademark license can unilaterally destroy a licensee’s 
business.  While trademark law is correct to afford great protection to 
trademark licensors, those protections may also unnecessarily frustrate 
the ability of a licensee to use a core asset of its business as leverage to 
reorganize and preserve its business for its employees, customers, and 
creditors. 
2.  Bankruptcy Law Purpose 
The purpose of bankruptcy law is twofold: to treat creditors equally 
according to their legal rights, and to give the honest debtor a fresh 
start.30  That fresh start is made possible through the Bankruptcy Code 
(the “Code”).31   
To the layperson, bankruptcy generally means the end of a 
business—that it must sell off all of its wares and shut its doors forever.  
This kind of bankruptcy is a Chapter 7 filing under the Code.  Chapter 7 
essentially creates a “forced sale” or liquidation that converts business 
assets into cash.32  Proceeds from the liquidation are then distributed 
among creditors according to priority.33   
However, bankruptcy may also serve as a means for a business to 
resuscitate itself—much like The Sharper Image has done.  
Reorganization is accomplished under Chapter 11 of the Code.  Chapter 
11 is effectively a system of negotiation among the participants in the 
 
29. See In re Travelot Co., 286 B.R. 447, 455 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002) (“The grant of a 
non-exclusive license is ‘an assignment in gross,’ that is, on personal to the assignee and thus 
not freely assignable to a third party . . . .”). 
30. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“[I]t gives to the honest but 
unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, 
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”).  See also In re 
Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (the goal of bankruptcy 
is to maximize the estate); In re Central Ark. Broad. Co., Inc., 170 B.R. 143, 145 (Bankr. E.D. 
Ark. 1994) (stating property of the estate includes licenses and business goodwill). 
Bankruptcy law, however, was not always so merciful.  See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 472 (1766) (stating “[Under Roman Law], 
creditors might cut the debtor’s body into pieces, and each of them take his proportionate 
share . . . .”) cited in DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY (INCLUDING BAPCPA): 21ST 
CENTURY DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 6 (2d ed. 2006). 
31. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 24–26. 
32. 11 U.S.C. § 704.  
33. 11 U.S.C. § 726.  While the focus of Chapter 11 is reorganization, the Code also 
allows for the sale of assets.  11 U.S.C. § 363.  
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bankruptcy.  The aim of a Chapter 11 reorganization is to reduce a 
business’s expenses while allowing the business to keep its doors open 
so that it may eventually become solvent again.34 
a.  Overview of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Chapter 11 provides several mechanisms that allow a business to 
reorganize.  First, when a business files for Chapter 11 reorganization, 
the debtor is granted a stay from creditors.35  The stay is a valuable 
shield that prevents creditors from foreclosing on assets and suing the 
debtor for money owed.36  Second, upon filing the debtor becomes a 
“debtor-in-possession” to act as a fiduciary for the debtor’s creditors.  
The fiduciary then takes control of the debtor’s property—known as the 
“bankruptcy estate.”37  Meanwhile, unlike other kinds of bankruptcy, 
the business continues operating and using property of the estate 
according to a reorganization plan.38  If a plan is confirmed and the 
debtor is successful in consummating that plan, then the debtor receives 
its “fresh start.”39 
Because this Comment considers the use of highly personal 
trademark rights in bankruptcy, it is necessary to develop further the 
understanding of who controls a business during a Chapter 11 
reorganization. 
b.  The Roles of the Debtor-in-Possession and the Chapter 11 Trustee 
In a Chapter 11 reorganization, either a debtor-in-possession or 
trustee takes the reins of the insolvent business.  Under the Code, the 
debtor-in-possession is essentially the debtor shed of its obligations to 
its creditors.40  When a court determines that a third party must be 
 
34. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).  
By permitting reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue 
to provide jobs, to satisfy creditors’ claims, and to produce a return for its owners . . . 
. Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in 
a rehabilitated business than if “sold for scrap.” 
Id. 
35. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), (4). 
36. Id. 
37. 11 U.S.C § 541. 
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (providing “[u]nless the court, on request of a part in interest and 
after notice and a hearing, orders otherwise, the trustee may operate the debtor’s business.”); 
11 U.S.C. § 1107 (stating “a debtor in possession shall have all the rights . . . of a trustee 
serving in a case under this chapter”). 
39. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 42. 
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1). 
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appointed to run the business, the court removes the debtor from 
control of the business and places control of the business in the hands of 
a trustee.41  While this practice is disfavored among courts, it is necessary 
in extraordinary circumstances where the current management has 
committed fraud or is grossly mismanaging the business.42  However, the 
prevailing policy is that a reorganization is likely to be more successful, 
affordable, and expedient when the party most familiar with the 
business is in control.43  
In the context of trademark licensees in bankruptcy, it is particularly 
important to understand that a debtor-in-possession has essentially the 
same rights, powers, and duties as a trustee.  As this Comment will 
explore later, at least one court has attempted to create a loophole by 
construing the debtor-in-possession to have different rights from those 
of a trustee.44  However, according to legislative history, Congress 
placed the debtor-in-possession “in the shoes of a trustee in every 
way.”45 
The goal of the debtor-in-possession and the trustee is to maximize 
the assets available to creditors.46  This means the debtor-in-possession  
will reach to virtually every asset—including real property and ongoing 
or executory contracts.47  In general, intellectual property licenses are 
 
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(d). 
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a); see, e.g., In re The 1031 Tax Group, Inc., 374 B.R. 78, 85 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (recognizing that the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee is an 
“extraordinary remedy”). 
43. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 232–34 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6191.  
44. See In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566, 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (arguing the 
terms “trustee” and “debtor-in-possession” have distinct meanings).   
Nowhere does the Bankruptcy Code define “trustee” as synonymous with “debtor” 
or “debtor in possession.” Quite the contrary, when the Bankruptcy Code refers to 
both “trustee” and “debtor” (or “debtor in possession”) in the same statutory 
provisions, the two terms are invariably invested with quite different meanings. 
Id. 
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a); see H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 232–34 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6360. 
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104.  
47. Under § 541, the Code details what may be property of the estate—including “all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 
U.S.C. § 541. The term “executory contract” is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, 
however, the “Countryman” test is generally used by courts to make this determination.  The 
Countryman test defines an executory contract as “a contract under which the obligations of 
both the bankrupt and the other party are so far unperformed that failure of either to 
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the 
other.”  Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy Law: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 
439, 460 (1973). 
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defined as executory contracts.48  
i.  Statutory Controls over Executory Contracts 
An executory contract is an agreement in which both parties have 
ongoing duties to one another.  While the Bankruptcy Code does not 
define the term, the characterization of a contract as “executory” is 
critical to the determination of each party’s rights to the agreement.  
Once a court finds that a contract, such as a trademark license, is 
executory, the agreement is governed by § 365 of the Code.  Section 365 
requires a debtor to reject, assume, or assign executory contracts.49  A 
debtor who rejects a contract is freed from obligations under the 
contract; the other party to the contract is relegated to a claim against 
the bankruptcy estate.50  Once an executory contract is rejected, it may 
be resold to another person willing to pay a higher rate.51  A debtor also 
has the choice to keep the contract through assumption.52  Or a debtor 
may assume and assign the contract to a third party, subject to certain 
limitations.53  Unlike assignment, a debtor who only assumes a contract 
is not placing the contract in the hands of another party.  However, the 
circuit split that has been highlighted by N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc. 
v. BG Star Productions essentially, and incorrectly, treats the 
assumption of trademark licenses as if the license is being handed over 
to a third party.54  Accordingly, this Comment will more fully explain 
what it means to assume an executory contract.  
ii.  Assumption of an Executory Contract 
A debtor who assumes its contracts is reaffirming those contracts for 
which it has already paid and may have built its business around.  The 
Code requires that a debtor who seeks to assume an executory contract 
must first cure any default or breach of the contract that is not related to 
the debtor’s insolvency or bankruptcy.55  Moreover, the Code invalidates 
 
48. 11 U.S.C. 365(e)(1); Menell, supra note 10, at 764–65 (“Trademark licenses are 
almost always executory because the licensor has continuing quality control obligations and 
the licensee typically has payment, reporting, marketing, and other continuing performance 
obligations.”).  
49. 11 U.S.C § 365(a), (f). 
50. 11 U.S.C § 365(a). 
51. PORT ET AL., supra note 13, at 536 (1999). 
52. Id. 
53. 11 U.S.C § 365(c)(1), (f). 
 54.   See N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1578 (2009) 
(denying petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.).   
55. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2). 
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any contract provisions requiring the forfeiture of the debtor’s rights 
upon insolvency or bankruptcy.56  However, the Code does permit the 
non-debtor to object to the assumption or assignment of an executory 
contract in certain situations under § 365(c)(1).  
iii.  Objection to Assumption of an Executory Contract by Non-Debtor 
Section 365(c)(1) has spurred multiple interpretations in bankruptcy 
courts, district courts, and appellate courts.  Section 365(c)(1) provides: 
 
The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or 
lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of 
duties, if— (1) (A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the 
debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance 
from or rendering performance to an entity other than the 
debtor or the debtor-in-possession, whether or not such contract 
or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation 
of duties; and (B) such party does not consent to such 
assumption or assignment.57 
 
According to one scholar, the plain language interpretation of this 
provision is that “if the estate wanted to assume, but not assign, a 
contract that is nonassignable in law, the non-debtor could prevent 
assumption of the contract, thus depriving the debtor of the benefit of 
the bargain.”58  Yet, this harsh interpretation, which forms the basis of 
the “hypothetical test” used by the majority of circuit courts, misstates 
Congress’s intent and produces an illogical result.59  
As this Comment will further develop, the prevailing interpretation 
of § 365(c)(1) produces a result that is inconsistent with the intent of the 
Code.  This interpretation provides that while a licensor may not 
preemptively protect its licensed mark from becoming part of a 
bankruptcy estate through an ipso facto contract clause,60 a licensor may 
still later strip a debtor-licensee of its rights in a license even if the 
 
56. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e). 
57. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1). 
58. Brett T. Cooke, Intellectual Property Licenses and Assignments under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code: A Brief Survey of the Nature Of Property Rights Conferred and 
Implications Due to Reorganization, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 213, 223–24 (2007). 
59. Id. at 224. 
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e).  
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licensee does not intend to assign the license to a third party.61  
If there is no concern that the debtor-licensee will turn the license 
over to a third party and that the licensor will have to accept 
performance from another, the protection granted to licensors under 
this interpretation is unjustified.  Further, if the license is a key asset of 
the bankruptcy estate, stripping the debtor of its benefit frustrates the 
entire purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization.  Instead, this Comment 
argues that where a debtor has no intent to assign the license, the debtor 
should be permitted to assume the license.62   
While the argument set forth in this Comment offers a logical 
approach to resolving the circuit split over the question presented in 
N.C.P. Marketing Group, there is a key issue that must be resolved 
before it can be adopted.63  First and foremost, Congress and the courts 
must treat trademarks as intellectual property and afford trademark 
licensees their due rights in bankruptcy.  
B.  The Conflict between Trademark Law and Bankruptcy Law 
Congress has failed to adequately secure trademark licensing rights 
in bankruptcy on two fronts: (1) under the Bankruptcy Code, 
trademarks are not considered intellectual property; and (2) Congress 
has not squarely defined the rights of a trademark licensee who is a 
debtor.  The failure to resolve these two key questions has contributed 
to the existing circuit split over a licensee’s rights to hold onto a 
 
61. See N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) 
(denying petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.).   
One arguable criticism of the hypothetical approach is that it purchases fidelity to 
the Bankruptcy Code’s text by sacrificing sound bankruptcy policy . . . [T]he 
hypothetical test provides a windfall to nondebtor parties to valuable executory 
contracts: If the debtor is outside of bankruptcy, then the nondebtor does not have 
the option to renege on its agreement; but if the debtor seeks bankruptcy protection, 
then the nondebtor obtains the power to reclaim—and resell at the prevailing, 
potentially higher market rate—the rights it sold to the debtor. 
Id.  See also Cooke, supra note 58, at 224. 
62. See Cooke, supra note 58, at 224.  
[While] [t]he majority of lower courts allow the debtor to assume an executory 
contract when the debtor has shown an intent not to assign the contract…the 
majority of the circuit courts . . . disallow assumption of a contract that cannot be 
assigned under nonbankruptcy law regardless of whether or not the debtor intends 
to assign it. 
Id.  See Menell, supra note 10, at 789 (stating “[t]he weight of scholarly opinion, emphasizing 
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, the tension between subsections (c) and (f), and the 
apparent intent of Congress as reflected in the legislative history, favors the application of the 
actual test.”) (citing EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY, §§ 5–15, at 258–59 (1993)). 
 63.  N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1578 (2009). 
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trademark license through its Chapter 11 reorganization. 
This part will look to legislative history to provide a brief overview 
of how the current conflict between trademark law and bankruptcy law 
emerged. 
1.  Trademarks Are Not Intellectual Property 
Law students learn that intellectual property consists of three core 
areas: patents, copyrights, and trademarks.  Yet, under the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, trademarks are not intellectual property.64  Rather, 
the Code states, “‘intellectual property’ means (A) trade secret; (B) 
invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35; (C) patent 
application; (D) plant variety; (E) work of authorship protected under 
title 17; or (F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17; to the 
extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law.”65  While peculiar, 
Congress made an intentional choice to exclude trademarks, trade 
names, and service marks as intellectual property in Bankruptcy cases.66  
The legislative history behind this definition of “intellectual 
property” reveals a fundamental failure by Congress to recognize the 
economic significance of trademarks.  The Code’s definition of 
intellectual property came in the wake of Lubrizol Enterprises v. 
Richmond Metal Finishers, a case decided at the outset of the 
Information Age in 1984.67  That Fourth Circuit case held a licensor in 
bankruptcy could strip a licensee of its right to use licensed 
technology—a decision that sent license-dependent technology 
industries into a panic.68  Computer and biotechnology companies feared 
this case would allow the bankruptcy court to cut off critical licensing 
agreements in one fell swoop—and possibly destroy their businesses.69 
Because of Lubrizol, members of the technology industry forecasted 
a widespread chilling effect among hi-tech developers if Congress did 
not intervene.  As James Burger, chief counsel for Apple Computer, 
explained to Congress in 1988, “[Lubrizol] undermines the utility of the 
 
64. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A). 
65. Id. 
66. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3206 (1988). 
67. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond 
Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986). 
68. Id.  
69. See, e.g., The American Bankruptcy Institute Survey: Hearing on S. 1626, S. 1358, S. 
1868, and S. 2279 (Bills pertaining to Title 11 of the U.S. Code, the Bankruptcy Code) Before 
the Senate Subcomm. on Courts, and Administrative Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
100th Cong. (1989).   
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license as a business tool.”70  If a licensee cannot be reasonably certain 
that its license is secure, Burger told Congress, the licensee will not 
make investments in the license.71  “[A]nything that does not assure the 
licensee of his rights to a continuing license—assuming he pays the 
required royalties himself—is counterproductive to licensing in general 
and, therefore, counterproductive to the best use of assets to further 
develop the American industrial system.”72  
Instead, given the unique nature of intellectual property, Burger and 
other industry lobbyists argued that the protections afforded to 
intellectual property licensees should align with those provided real 
estate lessees.73  Like a lessee, a licensee is given possessory rights that 
are less than the fee owner’s right, title, and interest in unique property.  
And like a lessee who pays for the right not to be a trespasser, a licensee 
pays for the right not to be an infringer.  Under the Code, a landlord 
may not unilaterally oust a tenant until the expiration of the lease.74  
Similarly, lobbyists argued a licensor should not be able to unilaterally 
oust a licensee simply because of a bankruptcy filing. 
Congress heeded to these concerns, if only narrowly, by enacting the 
Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act (“IPLBA”) in 1988.75  
Through the IPLBA, Congress sought “to make clear that the rights of 
an intellectual property licensee to use the licensed property cannot be 
unilaterally cut off as a result of the rejection of the license.”76  In the 
Senate version of the proposed bill, intellectual property was defined as 
“inventions, designs, works of authorship, mask works, protected 
information, trademarks, trade names, service marks, and other 
products of intellectual or creative effort now or hereafter protected by 
 
70. Intellectual Property Contracts in Bankruptcy: Hearing on H.R. 4657 Before the 
House Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong. 21 (1988) (statement of James Burger, Apple Computer, Inc.). 
71. Id. at 91. 
72. Id.  
73. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2006). 
74. Intellectual Property Contracts in Bankruptcy: Hearing on H.R. 4657 Before the 
House Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong. 23 (1988) (statement of James Burger, Apple Computer, Inc.). Congressional hearings 
reveal that had IPBLA been the law at the time of the Lubrizol decision, “Lubrizol would 
have retained its essential rights at that time, and there would have been a cash flow and a 
basis on which a reorganization of the licensor could have been accomplished to the benefit 
of all unsecured creditors.” Id. at 96. Instead, Lubrizol was “stripped of all its rights, to enable 
the licensor to go out and peddle those rights somewhere else.” Id. at 95.  
75. Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538 (1988). 
76. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3207. 
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applicable non-bankruptcy law.”77  Trademarks, trade names, and 
service marks were further protected by providing that the licensor had 
a duty “to permit existing grantees to continue in concert the quality 
assurance procedures of the licensor.”78  The bill was reviewed and 
revised by the National Bankruptcy Conference.79  In its revision, the 
Conference objected to the inclusion of trademarks as “intellectual 
property”:  
 
[B]y including trademarks, tradenames, and service marks in the 
definition, the bill appears to bring every retail franchise 
involving a trademark within the purview of the legislation, thus 
extending the reach of the bill far beyond what appears 
necessary the inclusion of trademarks also raises the thorny issue 
of continuing quality assurance for trademarks in the midst of 
bankruptcy, and the bill does not deal with this problem in an 
adequate way.80 
 
Thus, the Conference suggests exclusion of trademarks, trade names, 
and service marks is warranted because including them would open a 
Pandora’s Box of extraneous issues.81  However, the true motivation for 
the exclusion of these kinds of intellectual property seems to be more a 
matter of expediency.  This inference is supported by the Conference’s 
own statement that it saw “no such emergency for and [had] no 
particular interest in, extending such protection to trademarks 
connected with traditional distributorships and retail businesses at this 
time.”82  Instead, the Conference argued, “trademarks should be 
 
77. Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act, S. 1626, 100th Cong. (1987). 
78. Id. 
79. The American Bankruptcy Institute Survey: Hearing on S. 1626, S. 1358, S. 1868, and 
S. 2279 (Bills pertaining to Title 11 of the U.S. Code, the Bankruptcy Code) Before the Senate 
Subcomm. on Courts, and Administrative Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong. 255 (1989).  
80. Id. at 261. 
81. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.  
[T]rademark…licensing relationships depend to a large extent on control of the 
quality of the products or services sold by the licensee. Since these matters could not 
be addressed without more extensive study, it was determined to postpone 
congressional action in this area and to allow the development of equitable 
treatment of this situation by bankruptcy courts. 
Id.  See Xuan-Thao N. Nyguyen, Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1267, 1270 
(2004); Patrick Law, Intellectual Property Licenses and Bankruptcy—Has the IPLBA Thawed 
the “Chilling Effects” of Lubrizol v. Richmond Metal Finishers?, 99 COM. L.J. 261, 264 (1994). 
82. The American Bankruptcy Institute Survey: Hearing on S. 1626, S. 1358, S. 1868, and 
S. 2279 (Bills pertaining to Title 11 of the U.S. Code, the Bankruptcy Code) Before the Senate 
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excluded from the legislation and left for further study and separate 
treatment, hereafter, if necessary.”83  
So, while the technology sector of computer innovators and 
biotechnology developers brought a compelling case for swift action by 
Congress, the trademark lobby was swept aside.  As a result, trademarks 
are not afforded the same protections that other forms of intellectual 
property are given in bankruptcy.  Moreover, this lack of protection 
makes trademark licensees vulnerable to unilateral rejections of their 
licenses by licensors.  This is a perilous risk not only for businesses 
dependent on a trademark license, but also for such a business’s 
creditors. 
2.  Rights of a Trademark Debtor-Licensee 
The IPLBA offers a narrow solution to a narrow issue.  While the 
IPLBA was never broadened to include trademarks as intellectual 
property, it also limited its solution to situations in which the debtor is 
the licensor of the intellectual property.  Since the IPLBA, Congress has 
failed to provide a clear definition of a debtor-licensee’s rights in 
bankruptcy.  In absence of a clear answer, a split among the circuits has 
emerged. 
Regardless of the narrowness of the issue addressed by the IPLBA, 
its analysis forms an instructive analytical framework to resolve the 
existing split among the courts over how to treat trademark licensees in 
bankruptcy.  As Congress recognized in the development of the IPLBA, 
a licensor does not simply have the right to void an executory contract 
because of bankruptcy.  Rather, by definition of an executory contract, 
both parties to the agreement have ongoing obligations to each other.84  
While the current circuit split revolves around the rights of a licensee 
in bankruptcy, the same reasoning that protects a licensee when its 
licensor enters bankruptcy should apply: Licensees should not be 
 
Subcomm. on Courts, and Administrative Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong. 344 (1989).  
83. Id. at 345. 
84. See supra note 47 for a discussion of executory contracts.  See also Jason B. 
Binford, Supreme Court Passes on Assumption and Assignment of Trademark License 
Agreements, 28-JUN. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 83 (2009).  
[B]y definition, every executory contract subject to § 365 imposes continuing 
obligations on the part of the nondebtor party.  Rather than using the common law 
of trademarks to resolve the issue, the language of § 365(c)(1) indicates that a court 
should consider the issue in the limited context of whether the identity of the 
nondebtor party is significant under the particular facts at issue. 
Id.  
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stripped of their right to use a key asset, the licensing agreement, as 
leverage for their “fresh start” where there is no risk that a licensor will 
be forced to accept performance from a third party. 
However, the prevailing analysis among courts rejects this argument.  
Part II will introduce N.C.P. Marketing Group v. BG Star Productions 
to explain the two analytical frameworks used by courts to determine 
the rights of a trademark licensee in bankruptcy.  
PART II 
A.  In re N.C.P. Marketing Group 
Recently, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to a case that could 
have provided some certainty for trademark licensees involved in 
Chapter 11 proceedings.85  In N.C.P. Marketing Group, the Court was 
asked to consider whether a firm that was a debtor-licensee of the Billy 
Blanks TAE BO trademark could continue to use the license as a 
bankruptcy asset.86  While the Court recognized the paramount 
importance of resolving this issue, it concluded this was not the proper 
case to reach that resolution.87  However, the TAE BO case illuminates 
the current state of affairs facing trademark licensees in bankruptcy.  
This Part will address the development of the TAE BO case from the 
lower courts to the Supreme Court.  
1.  The Genesis of TAE BO  
In 1976, Billy Blanks was just a guy working out in his garage, 
blasting the recently released “Rocky” theme song—“Gonna Fly 
Now.”88  The champion-fighter imagery inspired Blanks, a martial arts 
expert, to integrate boxing elements into a new fitness regimen he 
 
85. N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (denying 
petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1578.   
The division in the courts over the meaning of § 365(c)(1) is an important one to 
resolve for Bankruptcy Courts and for businesses that seek reorganization. This 
petition for certiorari, however, is not the most suitable case for our resolution of 
the conflict. Addressing the issue here might first require us to resolve issues that 
may turn on the correct interpretation of antecedent questions under state law and 
trademark-protection principles. 
Id. 
 88.  What is the History of TAE BO Fitness?, 
http://www.teamtaebo.com/AboutTaeBo.html. 
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dubbed “TAE BO.”89 One journalist has described the program as a 
“fist-pumping, high-flying hybrid of kick boxing and aerobics.”90 
Eventually, Blanks opened a TAE BO studio in Sherman Oaks, 
California, where he garnered a retinue of devoted celebrities.91  Their 
endorsements along with a successful infomercial campaign hawking 
TAE BO videotapes, featuring Blanks clad in bold colors of muscle-
busting LYCRA unitards, created a successful fitness franchise by 
1998.92 
A year later in 1999, Blanks entered into a licensing agreement with 
N.C.P. Marketing Group (“N.C.P.”) to help him hawk even more 
tapes.93  That agreement granted N.C.P. the nonexclusive right to 
advertise and sell products and services containing Blanks’s TAE BO 
mark.94  However, soon after the agreement was made, the relationship 
deteriorated.95  N.C.P. later breached the licensing agreement by failing 
to pay Blanks royalties on the TAE BO trademark.96  While an 
arbitrator ordered N.C.P. to pay $2.1 million in royalties, N.C.P. instead 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.97  In that bankruptcy, N.C.P. claimed 
the TAE BO license as part of the bankruptcy estate.98  Blanks rejected 
the license, arguing that under the Lanham Act, the license was not 
assumable.99  In October 2004, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Nevada 
agreed with Blanks, finding that N.C.P. did not have permission to 
assume its licensing rights.100  
N.C.P. appealed.  In 2005, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Nevada affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order.101  The district court held 
that under federal trademark law, trademarks are personal to the 
 
89. TAE BO stands for “T” =Total, “A”= Awareness, “E” = Excellent, “B” = Body, 
“O” = Obedience.   About Tae Bo, http://www.teamtaebo.com/AboutTaeBo.html.  
90. James A. Fussell, Latest Craze Is ‘Same Old Stuff,’ Kick-Boxer Claims, CHI. TRIB., 
Feb. 23, 1999, at C7. 
91. Id. 
92. See Billy Blanks: Biography from Answers.com, 
http://www.answers.com/topic/billy-blanks; About the Creator of Tae Bo – Billy Blanks 
About Billy, http://www.billyblanks.com/category/meet+billy/about+billy.do. 
93. N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. Blanks (In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc.), 337 B.R. 230 
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2005).  
94. Id. at 233. 
95. Id.  
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id.  
101. Id. at 238. 
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assignee, and therefore, nonassignable without the consent of the 
licensor.  As such, a trademark license may not be assumed by a debtor-
in-possession without the licensor’s consent.102  The court based its 
decision upon its interpretation of § 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.   
B.  Assumption of the License  
In re N.C.P. Marketing Group asks whether a debtor-in-possession 
may assume (continue to benefit from) a trademark license held by the 
debtor before bankruptcy.103  If so, a debtor-in-possession could 
continue to receive the benefits of licenses to use the property of the 
licensor.  If not, a licensor could refuse assignment of rights by not 
consenting to assignment or assumption.104  Therefore, the outcome 
hinged on the district court’s understanding of § 365(c)(1). 
1.  The In re N.C.P. Marketing Group Court’s Interpretation of 
Bankruptcy Code § 365(c)(1) 
The district court in In re N.C.P. Marketing Group first observed 
that § 365(c)(1) “has been the subject of much controversy between 
circuits.”105  Section 365(c)(1) operates as an exception to the rule that a 
trustee may assume executory contracts, such as the license at issue in 
this case, if the licensor objects.106 
As one court has recognized, “[t]he basic policy goal in place in [§] 
365  is attempting to allow the debtor to realize the correct value of its 
estate, while also providing some protection to the nondebtor 
contracting party.”107 Yet, the meaning of this statute has been 
interpreted under two different views.108   
a.  The Hypothetical Test 
The first view strictly interprets the text of the statute by applying 
the “hypothetical test.”  That test asks whether, “hypothetically, without 
looking to the individual facts of the case, any executory contracts could 
 
102. Id. at 230–38 (“N.C.P. does not have the consent of the Blanks to license to third 
parties at this time and therefore cannot assume the trademarks under [11 U.S.C. §] 
365(c)(1).”). 
103. Id. at 230. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 234.  
106. Id. at 233. 
107. Pa. Elec. Co. v. United Foundry Co., No. 06-200, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70399 
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2009). 
108. See infra Part III.  
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be assumed under applicable federal law.”109  Thus, § 365(c)(1) ties 
nonassignability under “applicable law” to both assumption and 
assignment in bankruptcy.  The effect of this analytical framework is 
that even if the debtor-in-possession has no intent to assign the license 
to a third party, it still may not assume an executory contract if the 
nondebtor objects and “applicable law” would bar assignment to a 
hypothetical third party.  
b.  The Actual Test 
The second view, which applies the “actual test,” asks “whether the 
executory contract at hand, in actuality, can be assumed when applying 
the applicable federal law.”110  Under the actual test, assumption by the 
debtor-in-possession would be permitted and the nondebtor licensor 
would not be able to object since the licensor would not actually have to 
accept performance from a third party.  
c.  Applicable Federal Law 
Neither Blanks nor N.C.P. contended that the trademark license was 
an executory contract or that Lanham Act was the appropriate federal 
law to apply.111  However, the parties did “dispute whether applicable 
trademark law would bar assignment to a third party without consent of 
the assignor.”112  
To make this determination, the court drew analogies among other 
forms of intellectual property.113  The court reasoned that like copyrights 
and patents, trademarks “are personal and assignable only with the 
consent of the licensor and therefore unassumable under [§] 
365(c)(1).”114  The court further stated that unique, intangible nature of 
trademarks warranted even greater protections for trademark licensors 
than licensors of patents or copyrights.115  “Trademarks are valuable 
property rights that allow their owners to protect the good will of their 
name and products by preventing unwarranted interference and use of 
 
109. In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc., 337 B.R. at 234; Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. 
(In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1999) (analyzing whether 
restrictions under federal patent law prohibit a debtor from either assuming or assigning an 
executory patent license). 
110. In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc., 337 B.R. at 234. 
 111.   Id.  
112. Id. at 235. 
113. Id.  
114. Id.   
115. Id. at 236. 
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their mark by others.”116  Thus, because trademark owners must protect 
both the mark and the underlying business, there must necessarily be 
absolute control over whether the trademark may be assigned to a third 
party.117  
2.  Critique of In re N.C.P. Marketing Group 
 Ultimately, the district court interpreted § 365(c)(1) to require 
Blanks’s consent in order for N.C.P. to assume the license.  Given the 
acrimonious relationship between the parties, Blanks’s consent was 
unattainable.  Yet, the conclusion reached by the district court was 
flawed for at least two reasons. 
First, in line with the hypothetical test, the court imagines there is a 
third party to whom the mark will be assigned.118  However, a debtor-in-
possession is not a third party.  Rather, the debtor-in-possession is the 
debtor itself.  When the identity of the licensee does not change, the 
licensor is not being asked to consent to use of its mark by a third party.  
And if there is no concern for interference by third parties that could 
harm the licensor’s business or reputation, then concerns of consumer 
confusion and infringement fall away.  
Second, the district court maintains that trademark licensors are 
entitled to a short leash on their licenses because they must ensure 
quality control.119  However, as N.C.P. points out, that is not a primary 
concern where the goods being marketed and sold come directly from 
the licensor.  As N.C.P. explained, “[t]he goods identified by the 
licensed mark are [TAE BO] exercise videotapes manufactured from a 
master tape created by Blanks.  The product is genuine, regardless of 
whether the licensee is N.C.P. or a third party.”120  Moreover, the 
trademark licensee also has a vested interest in maintaining the quality 
of a mark.  Not only is this generally a requirement of a licensing 
agreement, but also the licensee shares an economic interest with the 
licensor to ensure the success of the mark in the marketplace.  
Thus, if there is no risk that a mark would be assigned to a third 
party, no risk of consumer confusion, and no quality assurance concerns, 
 
116. Id.  
117. Id.  
118. Id. at 237 (“Because we find that under applicable trademark law, trademarks are 
personal and non-assignable without the consent of the licensor, the Blanks’ trademark would 
be unassumable as part of the bankruptcy estate of N.C.P. without the Blanks’ consent.”). 
 119.   Id. at 236. 
120. Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. 
v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129. S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (No. 08-463), 2009 WL 157088 at *6. 
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the court’s reasoning that N.C.P. must have Blanks’s consent to use an 
agreement, for which it had already paid and built is business around, is 
flawed.  By inferring facts that did not exist, the court granted near 
monopolistic protections to trademark licensors and impaired a business 
from seeking Chapter 11 reorganization.   
C.  Questions Remain: N.C.P. Marketing Group v. BG Star Productions 
N.C.P. continued its fight to the Supreme Court.  In 2009, the Court 
reluctantly denied N.C.P.’s petition for a writ of certiorari.121  However, 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Breyer, issued a statement explaining 
that while the case before the Court was not an appropriate one through 
which to issue a final determination of a debtor-licensee’s right to 
assume an executory contract, the issue presented is a critical one.122  
Justice Kennedy noted in his statement that both the hypothetical 
and actual tests are imperfect analytical frameworks to determine a 
debtor-licensee’s right to assume a trademark.123  For example, Justice 
Kennedy noted that the hypothetical test results in a windfall to the 
licensor by allowing it to accomplish something it could not accomplish 
outside of bankruptcy—namely  the ability to resell the license to the 
debtor “at the prevailing, potentially higher market rate.”124  Thus, 
under the hypothetical test, a licensor is able to reap a substantial 
benefit that comes at the detriment of the licensee.  
And although the actual test is more closely aligned with “sound 
bankruptcy policy,” Justice Kennedy recognized that the actual test also 
has its shortcomings,125  primarily that the actual test may stray from the 
plain text of the law.126 
While the Court was not prepared to resolve this important issue 
through N.C.P. Marketing Group, hope remains that given an 
appropriate case, the Court will provide a resolution.  Until then, a 
distinct split over this issue persists among the circuits.   
Part III of this Comment recognizes that while the courts are split 
 
121. N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1578 (2009) 
(denying petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.) (“I reluctantly agree with the 
Court’s decision to deny certiorari.” ). 
122. Id. (stating “the division in the courts over the meaning of § 365(c)(1) is an 
important one to resolve for Bankruptcy Courts and for businesses that seek 
reorganization”). 
123. Id. at 1577–78. 
124. Id. at 1577. 
125. Id. at 1578. 
126. Id.  
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and no resolution seems imminent from the Supreme Court or from 
Congress, the interests of trademark law and bankruptcy law can be best 
served through the analytical framework of the actual test, rather than 
the hypothetical test.  
PART III 
A.  Conjunction Junction, What Is Your Function: Explaining the Circuit 
Split 
Whether a court applies the hypothetical or actual test to determine 
the rights of a trademark debtor-licensee essentially depends on how 
that court construes the function of the conjunction “or” in § 365(c).127  
As the In re Footstar court recognized,  “[t]he threshold issue . . . is a 
question of statutory interpretation—must the word ‘or’ in the statutory 
language ‘assume or assign’ be read literally, i.e., as a disjunctive, or 
should it be construed in context as the functional equivalent of the 
conjunction ‘and.’”128  While the In re N.C.P. Marketing Group court 
read the provision disjunctively to apply the hypothetical test, the case 
could have had a different outcome in a circuit that reads the provision 
conjunctively to apply the actual test.  Part III offers a brief overview of 
the differing statutory interpretations among the circuits.   
1.  The Hypothetical Test  
The Ninth, Third, and Fourth Circuits read § 365(c)(1) disjunctively 
and apply the hypothetical test.  In these circuits, a debtor-licensee who 
does not have the power to assign a license under the applicable law 
without the licensor’s consent also may not assume the license even if 
the debtor has no intent to assign the license.   
a.  The Ninth Circuit: In re Catapult Entertainment 
The Ninth Circuit applied the hypothetical test in In re Catapult 
Entertainment.129  In that case, a Chapter 11 debtor proposed to assume 
 
127. Schoolhouse Rock!: Conjunction Junction (ABC television broadcast 1973), lyrics 
available at http://www.schoolhouserock.tv/Conjunction.html (stating “And then there’s ‘or’: 
O-R, when you have a choice like ‘This or that.’).  Generations of children have learned the 
grammatical function of a conjunction from the famous Schoolhouse Rock cartoon 
“Conjunction Junction.”  Id.  The cartoon uses train cars to illustrate that the function of 
conjunctions is “[h]ooking up words and phrases and clauses.”  But, as the cartoon warns, one 
must “watch that function.”  Id. 
128. In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 569 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); Perlman v. Catapult 
Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 754 (9th Cir. 1999). 
129. In re Catapult, 165 F.3d 747.  
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a patent license as part of its reorganization plan.130  The licensor 
objected.131  The court agreed with the licensor, holding that the debtor-
in-possession could not assume an executory contract over the licensor’s 
objection if applicable law would bar assignment to hypothetical third 
party, even where a debtor-in-possession has no intention of assigning 
the contract in question to any such third party.132  
The court supported its reasoning by arguing that federal patent law 
made nonexclusive patent licenses personal and nondelegable.133  That 
characterization, the court stated, bars a debtor from assuming patent 
licenses without the licensor’s consent.134  While the court considered 
applying the actual test, it quickly jettisoned that test stating the actual 
test requires an unjustified “judicial rewrite” of the statute:135  “[T]hat 
the plain language of § 365(c)(1) may be bad policy does not justify a 
judicial rewrite.  And a rewrite is precisely what the actual test 
requires.”136 
However, by not permitting Catapult to continue using the license, 
the licensor doomed its licensee’s business.  Without the license, 
Catapult had no product.  With no product, Catapult was no longer an 
on-going concern and could not successfully complete a Chapter 11 
reorganization.   
Meanwhile, as the Supreme Court has noted, the licensor was free to 
sell the crucial license to another, perhaps higher bidder.137  Catapult 
demonstrates the Court’s concern that the hypothetical test frustrates 
the purpose of bankruptcy and gives the licensor powers it would not 
ordinarily have.138 
b.  The Third Circuit: In re West Electronics  
The Catapult court followed In re West Electronics in holding that 
the hypothetical test applies where a debtor-in-possession seeks to 
assume an executory contract.139  However, West did not involve the 
 
130. Id. at 749. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 754–55. 
133. Id. at 750. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 754. 
136. Id.  
137. See N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (denying 
petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.). 
138. Id. 
139. In re West Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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rights of an intellectual property licensee.  Rather, the question in West 
was whether the debtor, a defense contractor, could assume its 
government contract to manufacture military equipment.140   The court 
held the debtor could not assume the executory contract without 
consent from the government because applicable law barred assignment 
of the contract to a third party.141  The court recognized that such a bar 
was necessary to keep the government contractor directly accountable 
for any breach and to protect the government from having to accept 
performance from a third party.142   West argued that the applicable law 
did not bar assumption by its debtor-in-possession since the debtor-in-
possession is the debtor itself and not a third party.143  The court rejected 
that argument, stating “the relevant inquiry is not whether [applicable 
law] would preclude an assignment from West as a debtor to West as a 
debtor in possession, but whether it would foreclose an assignment by 
West to another defense contractor.”144  Therefore, because West could 
not assign its contract to a hypothetical third party, its debtor-in-
possession also had no “legally cognizable” right to assume the contract 
in its bankruptcy.145  Through this logic, the West court incorrectly 
construed the meaning of  § 365(c) to require the hypothetical test.  
While, the West court recognized the government had a right to keep 
its contract out of the hands of a third party, it went a step too far  in 
holding that the debtor and the debtor-in-possession were two distinct 
entities.146  Rather, the Code does not view the debtor-in-possession as a 
third party, but rather as the debtor itself.147  Further, the Code does not 
seek to strip a Chapter 11 debtor’s rights.  Rather, the Code seeks to 
protect and preserve the rights of the debtor.  Without these 
protections, the debtor would have few incentives to file for Chapter 11 
reorganization.   
 
 140.   Id. 
 141.   Id. at 82 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 15 (2006)). 
 142.   Id. at 83. 
 143.   Id.  
 144.   Id.  
 145.   Id. at 83–84. 
 146.  Id. at 84 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I do not 
believe that a ‘solvent contractor and an insolvent debtor in possession going through 
bankruptcy,’ . . . are different entities for the purposes of the Non-Assignment Clause.”). 
 147.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 232–34 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6360. 
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c.  The Fourth Circuit: In re Sunterra Corp. 
 Despite the shortcomings of the hypothetical test, the Fourth 
Circuit has also applied this analysis  to determine the rights of a debtor-
licensee.148  The court in In re Sunterra Corp. employed the plain 
meaning rule to reject the actual test, and deny Sunterra the right to 
assume a software license in its bankruptcy.149  Sunterra, a vacation 
timeshare operator, held a nonexclusive license to use software for its 
timesharing business.150  Sunterra bought the software license for $3.5 
million.151  The company then invested $38 million to design its own 
unique system to manage timeshare rights at its various resort 
locations.152  In 2000, Sunterra filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and sought 
to assume its software license.153  However, like the licensor in Catapult, 
Sunterra’s licensor filed a motion to have the court reject Sunterra’s 
license.154  The court sided with the licensor, reasoning that because the 
applicable law—copyright law—restricted the transfer of the license, 
Sunterra could not assume the license without the licensor’s consent.155  
As in Catapult, the licensor denied the licensee the right to benefit 
from a contract for which it had already paid and relied upon for its 
business.156  Thus, the unforeseen consequence of filing for 
reorganization was that Sunterra was forced to give up a significant 
asset of its estate.  Moreover, because the court deemed the license to 
be rejected, the licensor could then later renegotiate the license and 
demand a higher royalty rate from the licensee.  Again, Sunterra 
illustrates how the hypothetical test often yields a windfall to the 
licensor at the detriment of the debtor-licensee.157  
2.  The Actual Test: The First Circuit 
Under the “actual test” the court must make a case-by-case inquiry 
 
148. See, e.g., RCI Technology Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 
257 (4th Cir. 2004). 
149. Id. at 265. 
150. Id. at 271–72. 
151. Id. at 261. 
152. Id. at 260–61. 
153. Id. at 261. 
154. Id. at 262, n.7 (stating “copyright law is the applicable nonbankruptcy law that 
would excuse [the licensor] from accepting performance under the [a]greement from an 
entity other than Sunterra.”). 
155. Id. at 271–72. 
156. Id. at 261. 
157. See N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (denying 
petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.). 
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to determine “whether the nondebtor party . . . actually was being 
‘forced to accept performance under its executory contract from 
someone other than the debtor party with whom it originally 
contracted.’”158  The First Circuit, along with a majority of lower courts, 
has taken the view that the courts should apply an “actual test” in 
construing the statutory language so as to permit assumption where the 
debtor-in-possession has no intention to assign the contract. 
The court in Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech, applied the more 
logical analysis that first asks whether the debtor is actually trying to 
impose performance of the contract by a third party upon the licensor 
before stripping away the debtor-licensee’s rights.159  In Institut Pasteur, 
a patent licensor objected to a licensee’s use of its patents in bankruptcy 
based upon § 365(c).160  The licensor argued that the licensee’s sale of 
stock to the licensor’s competitor was a de facto “assignment” of a non-
assignable license under patent law.161  The licensee argued that the 
licenses were merely assumed into the bankruptcy estate, and that the 
licenses were “indispensable” to the success of its reorganization.162  The 
licensor argued that because of the stock sale, it would effectively be 
forced to accept performance from a third party, which the applicable 
patent law prohibited.163  The licensor further argued that the licensee 
was pulling a fast one—that while in form the licensee sought only to 
assume the license, but in reality it was seeking to assign the license to a 
third party.164  The court foreclosed that argument, citing another First 
Circuit case—In re Leroux.165   
In In re Leroux, the First Circuit rejected the hypothetical test.166  
Instead, the court held that § 365(c) contemplated a pragmatic “case-by-
case inquiry” into whether the licensor really would have to accept 
performance from a third party.167  Likewise, in Institut Pasteur, the 
 
158. Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 (1997) (emphasis in original) (quoting Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. 
v. Leroux (In re Leroux), 69 F.3d 608, 612 (1st Cir.1995)). 
159. Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 521 U.S. 1120 (1997). 
160. Id. at 490. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 491. 
163. Id. at 493. 
164. Id.  
165. Id. (citing Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux (In re Leroux), 69 F.3d 608, 612 
(1st Cir.1995)). 
166. Id.  
167. Id.  
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court applied the actual test and looked to whether the debtor-licensee 
actually sought to assign the license to a third party.  Because the 
debtor-licensee sought only to continue its business and use the license 
as it had before its bankruptcy,  the court permitted the debtor-licensee 
to assume the patent licenses.168   
Thus, in reaching its decision, the court weighed the potential risk to 
the licensor in allowing the debtor-licensee to assume the patent license.  
Finding no risk to the licensor, the court allowed the licensee to 
continue using a valuable bankruptcy asset essential for its 
reorganization—allowing the debtor to achieve its “fresh start.”169   
B.  An Alternative: In re Footstar  
 But, perhaps, as at least one court has recognized, this entire debate 
over a conjunction is for naught.  Instead, as the In re Footstar court 
suggests, § 365(c)(1) should be read even more plainly.  
In Footstar, the bankruptcy court concluded that use of the term 
“trustee” in § 365(c)(1) is not a synonym for the term “debtor-in-
possession,” as the other circuits have read it to be.  Rather, the court 
argued the terms have distinct meanings so that the prohibition against 
assignment and assumption under § 365(c)(1) is explicitly limited to 
situations in which the trustee, not the debtor-in-possession, seeks to 
assume an executory contract.170  Thus, while the debtor-in-possession 
could not assign the contract and force the licensor to accept 
performance from a third party, the debtor-in-possession could still 
assume the executory contract.171  As the court stated, to construe 
“trustee” in § 365(c)(1) to mean “debtors” or “debtors in possession” 
would defy the “plain meaning” of the statute as written by Congress.172 
However, that is not the intent of Congress and unfortunately, the 
resolution of this issue is not as simple as the Footstar court would like. 
Congress has clearly stated that in Chapter 11, the debtor-in-possession 
has the same rights as the trustee.173   
 
168. Id. at 495 (stating the licensee “remains in all material respects the legal entity 
with which [the licensor] freely contracted, [the licensor] has not made the required 
individualized showing that it is or will be deprived of ‘the full benefit of [its] bargain’”).  
 169.   Id. at 495. 
170. In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566, 573 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also In re 
Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 373 B.R. 135, 140–42 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007). 
171. In re Footstar, 323 B.R. at 575. 
172. Id. at 570–71. 
173. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 407 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6360. 
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CONCLUSION 
As the rate of Chapter 11 filings increases along with the value of 
trademark licenses, it is more important than ever that Congress and the 
courts answer the question of whether a debtor-licensee may assume a 
nonassignable trademark license.   
The prevailing hypothetical test unfairly provides a windfall for 
licensors while stripping debtor-licensees of trademark rights that are 
essential to their ability to keep a business going and to reach a 
successful reorganization under Chapter 11.  Not only is this result 
contrary to the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code, it also provides 
extraordinary monopolistic powers to trademark licensors.  While the 
Bankruptcy Code has excluded trademarks from the protections given 
to other forms of intellectual property, Congress has recognized that the 
rights of intellectual property licensees may not be stripped away simply 
because of a bankruptcy.  This reasoning should be applied to 
trademark licensees in bankruptcy who seek only to use the license as 
leverage to obtain a “fresh start.”  The actual test, which asks whether in 
fact a licensor will have to accept performance from a third party, 
balances the concerns of both bankruptcy law and trademark law.  
In absence of congressional action, courts should adopt the actual 
test to balance the need for business reorganization and the need for a 
trademark licensor to exercise control over its mark.  Under this 
analytical framework, both debtor-licensees and nondebtor-licensors 
will reap the benefit of their bargain.  
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